instance, that Catalans have lived together in the territory of Catalonia for many centuries can explain an implicit sense of intra-group solidarity. However, to state that Catalans carry the "same blood" or share an equally compelling industriousness and stinginess does not correlate with any empirical evidence. Indeed, ethnicity allows a wide range of stereotype representation.
Primordial ties are, like any other set of bonds, forged in historical time processes and are subject to shifts in meaning, ambiguities of references and open to political manipulation (Nash, 1989) . This is caused to great extent by the "unpolluted" presentation of ethnic ingredients such as culture, kinship, history, territory, or religion.
In fact, most of these are vague categories which are often analyzed out of context.
Many academics would agree that ethnic groups have a common history and culture. Furthermore, they would argue that these groups are characterized by distinguishable traits. The problem arises in the analysis of who the ancestors were, when collective consciousness took place, how cultural patterns were passed on from generation to generation, what kind of contacts with other groups were established, and which type of mutual interaction lay at the root of their social attitudes and values. Such aspects are widely open to ideological falsification and historical reconstruction. They also pose great methodological challenges in order to explain the various phases involved in the various processes of group mobilization, whether cultural or political.
Ethnic groups can be regarded as national, religious, geographic, linguistic and cultural collectives which do not necessarily coincide with racial groups and whose cultural traits have no demonstrated genetic connection with racial traits (Montagu, 1975) . In this paper we deal specifically with collectives of an ethno-territorial nature.
There has traditionally been a distinction between the territoriality principle and the personality principle (Coakley, 1994; McRae, 1975) . We will refer to ethnoterritoriality as a conceptual dimension where conflicts and political mobilizations are developed, in which the chief social actors are those ethnic groups which possess a geographical underpinning. Such a spatial reference is identifiable within the boundaries of a polity, usually of a compound or plural composition (Rudolph & Thompson, 1992) .
Ethno-territorial groups or movements can be divided into two broad categories: nationalist or regionalist. The task of distinguishing them is complex mainly because of the lack of linearity between both phenomena. In general terms, ethno-territorial groups share a somewhat analogous level of self-perception and self-identification. For our discussion, the view that ethno-territorial identity is not necessarily exclusive or incompatible with identities attached to state or supra-state levels is essential.
The debate on national identity can be set in the more general inquiry about the development of global changes in the structures of today's societies. Assumptions brought about by the forces of modernity are openly questioned, and national identities become more problematic while being corroded by the forces of "globalization". This process may also lead to the strengthening of local identities. That is to say, the discontinuity, fragmentation, and dislocation of social arrangements provides that different identities relate to each other in quite an unpredictable manner (Giddens, 1991; Melucci, 1989; McCrone, 1993) .
Dual identity and shared loyalties in Spain
Both ambivalent state building and national formation in Spain's modern history explain the duality of the way in which citizens identify themselves, to a considerable degree.
This concept of dual identity --or compound nationality--concerns the way citizens identify themselves in sub-state communities within pluriethnic polities. It incorporates --in variable proportions, individually or subjectively asserted--the local/ethno-territorial self-ascribed identity and the state/national identity produced by political integration --or, rather, malintegration--in the state-building process. As a result of this, citizens share their institutional loyalties at both levels of political legitimacy without any apparent fracture between them (Moreno, 1986 (Moreno, , 1988 .
The concept of dual identity provides a crucial element for the understanding and assessment of political conflict and ethno-territorial politics in contemporary Spain. It also provides a useful methodological tool for the measurement and interpretation of the degree of internal consent and dissent in "autonomical" Spain. Let us recall, as Juan Linz (1975) has observed, that:
"Spain today is a state for all Spaniards, a nation-state for a large part of the Spanish population, and only a state but not a nation for important minorities".
In broad terms, the quest for self-government by sub-state nations and regions is in full accordance with the variable manifestation of this duality: the more the primordial ethno-territorial identity prevails upon modern state identity, the higher the demands for political autonomy. Conversely, the more characterized the state-national identity is, the less likely it would be for ethno-territorial conflict to appear. In an extreme case, complete absence of one of the two elements of dual identity would lead to a sociopolitical fracture in the pluriethnic state, and demands for self-government would probably take the form of self-determination. In other words, when citizens in a sub-state community identify themselves in an exclusive manner, the institutional outcome of such antagonism will also tend to be exclusive.
In the case of Spain, the task of identifying and measuring both the cultural and the judicial categories involved in the concept of dual identity/compound nationality is far from simple. The changing nature implicit in such a duality complicates matters. Thus, positive perceptions on the action of the Spanish state by members of sub-state Comunidades Autónomas (Autonomous Communities) can result in a loosening of their self-ascribed local identity and a corresponding reinforcement of their sense of membership within the Spanish nation-state, and viceversa. Obviously, the dual identity concept modifies its constituent elements according to subjective perceptions and evaluations. In fact the reinforcement of one identity upon the other may well result in the complete disappearance of such a compound nationality as it now stands.
The existence of this compound nationality in most of the Spanish Comunidades Autónomas had its institutional correlation in the setting-up of regional legislatures and governments in the 1980s which have not only preserved local identities but have also projected the political aspirations of these sub-state communities. In the past the maintenance of regional ethno-cultural peculiarities in Spain was the result, at least partially, of the inefficiency and weakness of the centralizing forces. Since the approval by popular referendum of the 1978 Constitution, such cultural diversity has been greatly encouraged by the governments of the Comunidades Autónomas which have given priority to cultural, educational, linguistic, and mass media policies (Giner & Moreno, 1990 ).
As 1978 Spanish Constitution recognizes, the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia are three "historical nationalities" within the Spanish state. They are seen, therefore, as minority nations characterized by a "differential fact" or in other words, as distinct societies. After 15 years of widespread political decentralization, the political and spatial reorganization brought about by the progressive consolidation of the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías (State of Autonomies) is in line with a model of "multiple ethno-territorial concurrence" (Moreno, 1994 (Moreno, , 1995 . This model relates socio-political sub-state ethnic mobilization to the competitive interplay among Spanish nationalities and regions pursuing political and economic power, as well as to the achieving legitimation for their institutional development.
In all seventeen Comunidades Autónomas there is a high proportion of citizens who claim some form of dual identity (see Methodological Appendix for matters regarding survey data used in this paper). As shown in Figure 1 , aggregate data in percentages concerning self-identification by Spaniards in the period 1990-95 indicate that a degree of dual identity (categories 2/3/4) has been expressed by between two thirds and three quarters of the total Spanish citizenry ("More Andalusian, Basque, Catalan, Castillian, etc than Spanish"; "As much Andalusian, Basque, Catalan, Castillian, etc as Spanish"; and "More Spanish than Andalusian, Basque Catalan, Castillian, etc"). Furthermore, between a quarter and a third of all Spaniards have expressed a single identity (categories 1/5) with respect to either state/national or local/ethno-territorial dimensions ("Only Spanish" or "Only Andalusian, Basque, Catalan, Castillian, etc").
Note that shared identity in Spain as a whole is prevalent (category 3: "As much Andalusian, Basque, Catalan, Castillian, etc as Spanish"). However, differences are important in some nationalities and regions (see Table 1 for the cases of Andalusia, Aragon, Catalonia, Galicia, Basque Country, and Valencia). Between a fifth and a quarter of the total Spanish population regard themselves as exclusively Spanish, whereas around a tenth identify themselves as being only Andalusian, Basque, Catalan, Castillian, etc. As regards the Basque Country it is worth emphasizing that, in spite of the climate of political violence induced by ETA terrorism, the number of Basques expressing a degree of dual identity has remained stable without major fluctuations in recent years. However, the percentage of those who identify themselves exclusively as Basques (between a quarter and a third of the total Basque population) marks a clear deviation with respect to single identity figures in the whole of Spain (10 per cent, approximately). Catalans and Galicians also show over 10 per cent of "exclusiveness".
The Catalan case
Broadly speaking, the number of Catalans expressing a degree of dual identity has been higher than 60 per cent over the period under consideration . As shown in Table 1 , it has fluctuated from 77 per cent in 1986 to 61.2 per cent in 1992, and went back to its peak in 1994 (78 per cent). These variations are related to changes in both exclusive identifications ("Only Spanish", "Only Catalan"), but no apparent polarization can be drawn from this observation. Spanish exclusive identity went up from 11 per cent in 1986 to reach proportions of around 20 per cent in the period 1990-93, and then down to 11.3 per cent in 1994. Catalan single identity increased from 6.3 per cent in 1990 to 17.1 per cent in 1992. Since then it has declined to 10.3 per cent in 1995 (see Table 2 ). Having said that it is worth noting that Catalan identity has a larger degree of duality: those respondents identifying themselves as "More Catalan than Spanish" outnumbered those who felt "Only Catalan". Only in recent years can the same be said of Spanish identity.
A broad stable composition can be observed in the figures of self-identification throughout Catalonia. However, a number of modifications can be traced down (eg. increases in the dual and shared options, as well as in the duality of Spanish identities, or in the lack of identity transfers from Catalan to Spanish exclusiveness). Let us note, in any case, that we have dealt with data obtained from a rather short time span and that the indicator is not sufficiently sensitive. Further research with more suitable methodological tools and a longer time span under observation is necessary in order to gain reliability.
An immediate finding concerning age is that no large variations can be underlined (Table 3) . Shared identity accounts for around 40 per cent of the total and is very similar in all four age groups (18-29 years of age, 30-44, 45-50, 60 and over).
Deviation is produced in the youngest group (18-29) which expresses a higher degree of Catalan identity vis-à-vis Spanish identity (N.B. The shared identity percentage, however, is the same as compared with the Catalan population as a whole). The 45-59 age group shows a higher degree of Spanish identity (31.5 per cent as compared with mean figure of 27.6 per cent).
Self-identification by the younger group is more in line with Catalan and dual identities, but the interpretation of the various generational biographies seems to be a better route to explain differences.
Self-identification according to sex does not translate into significant differences (Table 4 ). Notwithstanding, a higher level of Spanish single identity is noticeable among women (18.3 per cent as compared with 15.9 per cent corresponding to the male population).
-Place of birth
A greater proportion of citizens born in and outside Catalonia identify themselves as being "As much Catalan as Spanish": 41.5 per cent and 37 per cent, respectively (see Table 5 ). But significant differences in self-identification by both groups can be detected: while around 46 per cent of those citizens born in Catalonia express a predominantly Catalan identity ("Only Catalan" and "More Catalan than Spanish"), those have been born outside Catalonia declare a higher Spanish identity (around 51 per cent).
Dual identity figures are notably higher regarding respondents born in Catalonia (75 per cent) than those born outside Catalonia (61.8 per cent). This variation mostly results from the higher duality of those citizens born in Catalonia who feel "More Catalan than Spanish" (around 28 per cent) in comparison with the higher proportion of citizens born outside Catalonia with a single identity (32.7 per cent of "Only Spanish"). This observation is consistent with our above mentioned interpretation on Table 3 about differences between Catalan and Spanish identities.
In the light of these figures, is it legitimate to conclude that there are two separate collectives or, rather, that they are interwoven in various degrees and manifestations?
For further research there is still the analysis of the evolution of the identities of second and third generations immigrants in Catalonia. This might prove to be clarifying and indicative of future trends and developments.
-Size of town
As shown in Table 6 , self-identification in towns of less than 10,000 residents, Catalan identity is higher than the average (between 34.5 and 44 per cent).
Nevertheless, dual identity figures are also higher than percentages corresponding to total numbers (between 71.3% and 74.8% as compared to 69.8% for the total percentage). Excluding Barcelona, in those towns with a population over 10,000
inhabitants Spanish identities are equal or higher than Catalan identities. Accordingly, it can be established that with the increase of population there is a parallel decrease of dual identity together with a stronger manifestation of Spanish single identity. Towns where Catalans live are related to diverse cultural contexts which have a direct influence in the way citizens identify themselves. However, the concentration of immigrants in specific areas and towns (eg. the "industrial belt" around Barcelona) turns out to be a crucial element when explaining differences in the data. This element has to be considered in close combination with place of birth, a variable which generally proves to be well-equipped for plausible explanations across social indicators of various kinds.
-Social class
Under the heading "social-class", Table 7 incorporates hierarchically listed data according to ascription by the respondents themselves into five classes: Upper, Upper Middle, Middle, Lower Middle, and Lower. As the placement into these categories is essentially subjective the low number of respondents in the extreme positions ("Upper" and "Lower") does not come as a surprise.
An interrelation between functional (class) and spatial (place of birth) variables points out to the fact that identity variations are reflected in any position of the social class scale depending mainly on whether those interviewed were born in or outside Catalonia. Thus, over 70 per cent of all respondents born in Catalonia expressed a degree of dual identity independently of their self-perceived social class. For those born outside Catalonia the degree of dual identity is much lower (61 per cent on average of all social classes). Having said that, some common features ought to be pointed out.
There is a similar pattern towards an increasing duality from higher to lower social classes for respondents born in and outside Catalonia. Moreover, there is a noticeable decreasing trend in Catalan identity ("Only Catalan" and "More Catalan than Spanish") from higher to lower classes which applies to both groups of interviewees born in and outside Catalonia.
The highest levels of dual identity and, particularly, of shared identity ("As much Catalan as Spanish") are to be found among those who ascribe themselves to the lower middle class. At each level of the social class scale, the differences regarding those respondents born in and outside Catalonia are reflected in a similar way to that indicated by Table 5 . It can therefore be supposed that higher social classes correspond more generally to Catalan identities and that lower classes correlate more closely to dual and Spanish identities.
-Occupation
This is an indicator of a more objective nature which has been divided in Table 8 into eight categories (Housewife, Student, Retired, High occupational, Middle occupational, Low occupational, and Unemployed). Establishing hierarchical listings as regards other categories ("Housewife", "Student", "Retired, Pensioner") is not an easy task. There are hardly variations with housewives, either born in or outside Catalonia. The same can be said for the "Retired" category.
A great majority of students have been born in Catalonia and express a higher degree of dual and Catalan identities, an observation consistent with what was interpreted for Table 3 . Those students born outside Catalonia express a higher level of dual identity than the rest of the occupational groups. However, the percentage (66.9 per cent) is lower than the duality of those students born in Catalonia (76.2 per cent).
-Education
This is another objective indicator. However, it should be borne in mind that some overlapping of old and new curricula might have been produced in the data (eg.
Elementary Secondary and High School). As shown in Table 9 differences according to place of birth take shape as two distinct patterns of self-identification. In this respect it is important to note the educational inequality between both groups: while citizens born in Catalonia are over-represented in high educational levels, those born outside Catalonia concentrate primarily in low levels.
Dual identity is lower at middle educational levels than at University levels.
Catalan identity increases according to educational learning. This appears to be the case for citizens born in Catalonia (39.2 per cent for "Primary School" and 55.9 per cent for "University Higher"). The same trend, although in more moderate ratios, is observable for citizens born outside Catalonia (10.9 per cent for the "Illiterate" to 18.5 per cent for "University Higher").
In order to explain trend changes in future citizens' self-identification two considerations should be taken into account: (a) Generational differences related to educational tuition, and (b) Differences in educational levels achieved according to parents' place of birth.
-Ideology
First and foremost, there is a high proportion of non-responses ("No answer"). As shown in Table 10 Highest percentages of single identity are in the "Right" (30.4 and 48.9 per cent) and in both "Extreme Right" and "Extreme Left". Catalan identity is predominant among those self-ascribed to the category of "Centre Right" (58.8 and 17.4 per cent with place of birth in and outside Catalonia, respectively). It is also significant for those born in Catalonia in the ideology groups of "Centre" (54.9 per cent) and "Centre Left" (58.8 per cent).
Lower levels of Catalan identity for "Left" respondents translate into higher percentages of shared identity for those born in Catalonia (46.9 per cent) and of Spanish identity for those born outside Catalonia (52.6 per cent).
Conclusion
Self-identification by Catalans shows a considerable degree of duality. Shared identity ("As much Catalan as Spanish") has increased steadily during the period under observation. In parallel, a decline in the percentages for both Catalan identity ("Only Catalan" and "More Catalan than Spanish") and Spanish identity ("Only Spanish" and "More Spanish than Catalan") is also observable.
An analysis of the different types of variation seems to indicate that even Catalan identity is constituted, to a greater degree, by the dual option of "More Catalan than Spanish", whereas in the Spanish identity the single option ("Only Spanish") is predominant. The trend regarding the latter has been somewhat reversed in recent years .
Close to three quarters of young respondents identify themselves in a dual manner. Also this group is characterized by analogous ratios for both shared and The periodical repetition of part of the questionnaire allows the analysis of time series as well as its aggregation for statistical purposes. In this way, larger samples can be obtained with a higher degree of reliability, and population areas such as Catalonia can be also analyzed. On aggregating data certain methodological limits have to be acknowledged, mainly those referring to time variation.
For the purposes of our paper, data from 47 survey polls from October 1990 until September 1995 have been aggregated resulting in a sample of 57,600 cases. For the Catalan case, 9,127 questionnaires have been selected. The sample has been weighted by sex and age according to the Catalan distribution in the Spanish 1991
